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ABSTRACT 
 
There were five main objectives for the trials cruise: The first tests of the Autosub Long Range 
AUV,  testing  of  the  HyBIS  video  guided  grab  system,  testing  of  the  MYRTLE-X  Lander 
systems, testing of a deep camera system for the Lake Ellsworth probe and test deployments of 
the PELAGRA neutrally buoyant sediment capture drifters.  
 
The  working  area  was  about  300  miles  south  west  of  the  Canary  Islands,  in  international 
waters, over benthic plains of 4000 m depth, with some tests of the video systems over a 
isolated sea mount rising to 1200 m depth. Most of the objectives of the cruise where met, with 
successful diving and control of the Autosub LR, tests of the HyBIS and Ellsworth camera 
systems, and 3 deployments and recoveries of two PELAGRA floats. Several wire tests of 
MYRTLE-X systems were carried out, predominantly successful, but concerns over the release 
system prevented a deployment of the lander.  
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3. Itinerary 
Departed Santa Cruz, Tenerife, 19th January 2011 
Arrived Santa Cruz, Tenerife, 2nd February 2011 
 
4. Diary of Events 
 
Start  Time     
Date   (GMT)    Activity 
       
16/01/2011  12:00    Mobilisation 
19/01/2011  08:54    Passage to Autosub Launch Site 
20/01/2011  17:48    Rigging CTD 
20/01/2011  18:10    CTD#1 
20/01/2011  19:19    Rigging Pelagra buoys 
20/01/2011  22:35    Deploying and Recovering Pelagra Buoys 
21/01/2011  00:24    Standing By whilst AUV tests continue. 
21/01/2011  13:05    Transducer test using CTD wire 
21/01/2011  14:00    Rigging and Testing of Equipment for Ellsworth Camera 
21/01/2011  20:06    Ellsworth Camera Ops using Deep Tow 
21/01/2011  21:18    Ellsworth Camera fault finding 
22/01/2011  03:10    Ellsworth Camera Ops using Deep Tow 
22/01/2011  07:36    Winch Problems encountered during last 100m of recovery 
22/01/2011  08:10    Conducting Various test on AUV Prior to launch 
22/01/2011  09:20    AUV operations 
22/01/2011  11:48    Rigging of Myrtle Lander equipment 
22/01/2011  13:58    Testing of Myrtle Lander equipment using CTD wire 
22/01/2011  17:38    Transit to Pelagra buoys 
22/01/2011  19:00    Recovering Pelagra buoys 
22/01/2011  19:48    Transit to Tropic Seamount 
22/01/2011  22:51    HyBIS operations 
23/01/2011  06:44    Autosub preps 
23/01/2011  12:59    Autosub ops 
23/01/2011  16:13    Rigging of Myrtle Lander equipment 
23/01/2011  20:28    Testing of Myrtle Lander equipment using CTD wire 
23/01/2011  22:46    Rigging Pelagra Buoys 
24/01/2011  00:05    Deploying Pelagra buoys 
24/01/2011  00:34    Fault finding on HyBIS,  repositioning  ship to Tropic Seamount and 
Preparing Autosub 
24/01/2011  11:30    Autosub Operations 
24/01/2011  13:22    Waiting on Weather for launching Autosub and effecting repair to AC in 
winch Suite 
25/01/2011  16:25    HyBIS operations 
25/01/2011  21:23    Reposition v/l and rigging Ellsworth Camera 
26/01/2011  02:40    Waiting for Lander to surface 
26/01/2011  05:04    Preparing Autosub 
26/01/2011  08:53    AUV ops 
26/01/2011  11:27    Preparing Autosub  
26/01/2011  15:00    Autosub ops. Autosub recovered due to damage to it 
26/01/2011  15:57    Awaiting Pelagra buoys to surface and reposition to buoy site - 8 - 
 
26/01/2011  19:18    Recovering 2 x Pelagra buoys 
26/01/2011  20:48    Rigging Elsworth Camera 
26/01/2011  22:00    Elsworth Camera ops 
27/01/2011  02:15    Reposition vessel to North of Seamount. Rigging Lander communications 
kit to CTD wire 
27/01/2011  12:36    Lander communications testing 
27/01/2011  19:18    Rigging Pelagra buoys 
27/01/2011  20:08    Deploying Pelagra buoys 
27/01/2011  20:40    Reposition Vessel to approx 4000m of water 
27/01/2011  21:41    Elsworth Camera ops 
28/01/2011  03:32    Preparing  Autosub. Operations  eventually cancelled due to  WX and 
technical issues with Autosub 
28/01/2011  18:32    Deployment of deep tow wire for test purposes 
28/01/2011  21:11    Awaiting Autosub launch 
29/01/2011  16:48    Autosub ops 
29/01/2011  17:48    Transit to Pelagra buoys 
29/01/2011  22:48    Recovering 2 x Pelagra buoys 
29/01/2011  23:32    Lander communications testing 
30/01/2011  00:42    Awaiting AUV launch 
30/01/2011  10:15    AUV Ops 
30/01/2011  14:14    Rigging AUV 
30/01/2011  15:34    AUV Ops 
30/01/2011  21:12    Rigging Deep tow test WT 
30/01/2011  21:30    Conducts tests on deep tow winch 
31/01/2011  00:48    Relocate to Position closer to Tenerife but in International waters 
31/01/2011  04:50    Awaiting weather to Moderate. No improvement End Science set onto 
Tenerife 
31/01/2011  13:00    Passage to Tenerife 
02/02/2011  10:29    Demobilising - 9 - 
 
5. Autosub Long Range Operations.  
 
Steve McPhail, Peter Stevenson, Miles Pebody, James Perrett, Maaten Furlong. 
 
 
Alex Phillips, Maaten Furlong, Miles Pebody, Steve McPhail, Peter Stevenson, James Perrett, Mario 
Brito, Leo Steenson. Autosub LR , with top panel removed revealing the two main pressure spheres 
(forward – battery, aft – control system, ADCP).  
Summary of Autosub LR deployments on RRS Discovery 360 
The cruise was a success and important milestone for the Autosub Long Range AUV programme . 
The AUV dived, controlled its heading and depth accurately at a range of speeds tested from 0.33 to 
0.62 ms
-1. The effective control of heading and depth (to fraction of a degree rms) was an important 
achievement not only for practical purposes (simplifying further testing), but also that it proved that a 
novel control technique for the AUV (controlling without any explicit feedback of the actuators 
position), worked effectively. The control was able to cope with significant control plane backlash. 
There were no problems with the magnetic couplings for propulsion or actuation. The AUV also 
floated sensibly on the surface, with good antennae exposure. The ADCP worked well, as did the 
attitude and heading sensor. The production of mission scripts using the dynamic linked library 
approach proved workable and flexible.  The abort system repeatedly and correctly reacted to the 
events of I2C interface stopped, ADCP data stopped, ground fault.  
The hydrodynamic design of the AUV was shown to be successful, with the in house designed, 
single-bladed propeller proving effective at powering the AUV, and the wings and control planes 
producing a stable vehicle capable of operating at very slow speeds.  The cruise has thus demonstrated 
the effectiveness of the hydrodynamic design, a crucial element in allowing Autosub LR to achieve its 
very long range. Considering that the AUV had never before moved in water, this all was a very 
satisfactory result.  - 10 - 
 
The mechanical systems also proved to be easy to work on, robust and reliable.  The actuators and 
propulsion motors could be quickly removed allowing modifications to the onboard software, while 
the installation of the antennae and lights in the top fin proved effective from both a hydrodynamic 
and functional perspective.  The control planes also proved very hardy with a number of impacts with 
the ship on producing only minor damage which could be simply rectified.  
Launch procedures, with one contact with the ship early on,  improved throughout the cruise, with the 
‘head off on current heading’ mode working effectively to drive the AUV from the ship. Recovery 
was practical, but only in sea states of 4 (possibly low 5) or less on this vessel. 
There were, however, many problems identified. Several of these were known of before the cruise, 
and had not, despite our best efforts, been completely mitigated pre cruise.  Others were faults or 
vulnerabilities identified which will naturally disappear when the system is fully implemented as 
originally conceived.  A lack of robustness in the system electronics was revealed, as a consequence 
of damage during the launch and recoveries. The hardware was surprisingly robust, although some 
strengthening of the final actuation drive may be needed for long deployments where very rough seas 
can be expected. However, it should be appreciated that this vehicle is designed for energy efficient, 
long duration missions, and once launched would not be expected to experience the degree of stresses 
experienced during the cruise, with at times two launches and recoveries in a day.  
So, in the main , these problems were inconveniences (often major inconveniences) during the trials 
cruise, and are not of great concern for the development programme, they being either fixable, 
irrelevant in the final version, or are a type predictable due to lack of testing time pre cruise (due to 
our effort spent trying to debug problems rather than system test) , and the frequency of these 
problems should decrease during the development programme. However, in the light of our 
experiences, the issue of system vulnerability to a single flooding event of an actuator or motor will 
be considered further.  
Drag and Propulsive Efficiencies. 
The propulsion system on Autosub Long Range comprises an in-house designed single bladed 
propeller attached to a custom designed magnetic coupling.  This is driven by a brush-less DC motor 
which in turn is controlled by an in-house designed control board.  All of this was contained in an in-
house designed pressure housing.  As the system was custom designed for this AUV, there was some 
uncertainty about how it would perform on the vehicle, particularly with respect to the propeller. 
Observations of the early missions show that the propulsion system performed well; this was a real 
success given the novelty in the design.  Unfortunately, the installed propulsion motor was irreparably 
damaged by impacting the ship during the launch on 26/1/2011. Prior to that useful drag figures had 
not been obtained, as the vehicle pitch and heading control had not been successfully tuned. 
Again, unfortunately the spare propulsion motor was found to be faulty just before the cruise 
mobilisation, and the only replacement that could be delivered in time was of a different specification 
to the original. This series of events somewhat limits the applicability of the results which we did 
obtain.  
There were only two sets of results which give useful drag figures. Mission 9 and Mission 10 (the last 
mission). 
With only a very basic analysis at this time no attempt has been made to separate out the coefficient of 
drag from the propulsive efficiencies (propeller, motor and gearbox). Rather it has so far only been 
possible to estimate  the ratio  K= Cdv/Є,  where Cdv is the drag coefficient (based on Volume
2/3, as is 
our norm) and Є is the total propulsive efficiency. Hence K is a unitless coefficient, a scaled up 
version of Cd.  
For comparative purposes, the K value for Autosub6000 is of the order of 0.12, which is also 
approximately the target performance which we are aiming for with Autosub Long Range.  
From :       𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡.𝜖 =
1
2𝜌.𝐶𝑑𝑣.V
2
3 .U3     - 11 - 
 
Where Ptot is the total input electrical power (measured), V is the AUV volume, U the speed though 
the water (measured by the ADCP).  
Hence it is easy to calculate K= Cdv/Є.  
For Mission 9 , the AUV ran at 0.62 ms
-1, and had a total input power of 17.2 Watts. This yields a K 
value of 0.12.   Buoyancy was 19 N. 
For Mission 10, the AUV ran at 0.33 ms
-1 and had a total input power of 6.65 Watts. K is 0.35.  
Buoyancy was 12 N.  
Hence the AUV is performing at near specification for the higher speed, and factor of almost 3 x 
worse than specification at the lower speed. These results give some encouragement,  plus a pointer to 
the need to gather more data and investigate further. The poor results at lower speed may be simply 
due to the (replacement ) motor mismatch, and running at lower than the designed minimum speed, 
hence, for the moment, are not a cause of great concern.  
Further analysis and testing of the propulsion system should allow some resolution of the drag and 
propulsive efficiency figures, even given the sparse dataset. Knowing the propeller characteristics , 
with the measured RPM, vehicle speed and motor torque, should provide an estimate of the AUV’s 
drag (the greatest uncertainty being in the inflow conditions which have been calculated using 
computational fluid dynamics). 
It is quite unfortunate that poor weather prevented the final planned tests , involving multiple speeds, 
and varying buoyancy (by varying the depth), plus a buoyancy driven steep ascent. This would have 
provided a great deal of information, thereby allowing the drag and efficiencies to be more effectively 
resolved. However, given the novelty in the propulsion system design, the results that have been 
obtained show that the system is working effectively and the design choices made produced a credible 
system. 
Control Performance 
Due to the very low speeds that the AUV would be operating in, the AUV would be operating in very 
low Reynolds number flows.  Thus, considerable care needed to be taken in the hydrodynamic 
analysis as significant uncertainties exist in these regimes.  It was therefore pleasing to see that the 
hydrodynamic design made the AUV stable in straight and level flight; this is a major requirement for 
the AUV’s long range ambitions.  The control planes also worked well at the low Reynolds numbers 
experienced without showing the hydrodynamic dead band seen on some aerofoil sections seen in 
these flow conditions.  The mechanical limits to the control plane travel, imposed by the control 
architecture, proved to be correctly set allowing the AUV to quickly manoeuvre without showing 
signs of stalling. The wings also proved very effective at allowing the AUV to operate at a very low 
0.33 ms
-1  without producing significant pitch in the AUVs.  These results, although only early 
observations, give significant confidence that the basic hydrodynamic design of the AUV is well 
suited to achieving the very long range laid out in the specification. 
The Autosub LR has an unusual control approach :  the actuators have no feedback mechanism 
(beyond internally ) counting how far they have moved (by hall effect transition counting), the control 
loop makes no attempt to measure the actuator position, and the control demand to the actuators is a 
“move by angle”, rather than “move to angle”. The reason for all this, is in a word, simplicity, or more 
precisely hardware simplicity. The absence of a position sensing device removes one more sensor (for 
each actuator) which could potentially fail.  
Initial control gains were set rather high. This was done for AUV safety reasons. Due an initially 
rather large deadband in the actuator control , there was concern that the actuator might not react at all 
to small repeated demands, and the AUV potentially dive out of control.  Later in the cruise, the 
deadband was reduced significantly from 2 degrees to about 0.5 degrees, significantly reducing this 
problem.  
These settings,  did, as expected, cause unstable control (approximately +/- 10 degrees oscillation in 
pitch , with a period of 25 seconds).  However the degree of instability , and ineffectiveness of - 12 - 
 
reducing control gain to improve stability, did not, at first, tally with simulation results. Eventually it 
was realised that the settings for actuator were artificially, and unnecessarily, introducing a process 
delay in the control loop of more than three seconds. This would be significantly destabilising. 
Adjustment of the relevant parameter in the simulations, plus extra information introduced into the 
simulations from the early test results (such as the effective turn rate at full plane demand), produced 
simulation results which matched reality more closely, allowing us to more effectively select the 
control parameters.  The problem with the actuators were also easily solved, such that no unnecessary 
process delay was added, the only delay being due to the limited slew rate of the actuators.  A further 
problem was identified in the actuators – the effective operating voltage was lower than specification 
due to an incorrectly calculated pulse width modulation setting. Once corrected , this also increased 
the system phase margin by increasing the plane slew rate.  
Simulation results  showed that there would still be a residual limit cycle behaviour in yaw and pitch, 
as a consequence of the actuator dead bands. Although the values of this cycling would probably not 
be of any great consequence (+/ - a degree or two in pitch), it was felt that it would mask out the finer 
details of the linear control performance, making it difficult to resolve changes due to different control 
parameters, and so for the purposes of the tests, it would be useful to be able to mitigate this problem. 
The solution was to “dither” the control planes. For each of the 1 second control cycles , alternately 
+/- 0.5 degrees was added to the control plane move demand. Simulations, eventually confirmed by 
the mission data, showed this to be effective in removing the dead band non linearity.  
A series of tests were carried out during mission  9, with a set of 12 different control setting 3 each of 
the integral coefficient and 4 of the proportional coefficient.  
The control stability for the tuned parameters were very satisfactory, there is a 5 minute section of 
mission 9, where the high pass pitch standard deviation is less than 0.5 degrees, and the high pass 
filtered  depth standard deviation is less than 60 mm  (the data was passed through a simple 100 
seconds time constant high pass filter prior to evaluation of the standard deviations, as the lengths of 
the runs at different depth demands was not sufficient for the depth achieved to be fully stabilised – 
see figures 2 and 3).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Depth Demand (green), and achieved depth for mission 9. Due to fault, the AUV lost control 
at 3900 seconds, and the mission was aborted. - 13 - 
 
 
Figure 3. The Pitch demand (green), and pitch achieved for the set of control coefficients. The best 
control was achieved for the first three sets of control parameter at the start of the run.  Best results 
are  for I = 0.05, P = 0.6, where P and I are the control coefficients (2
nd demand, 2600 to 2750 
seconds).  The start of the test begins at 2400 seconds. 
For mission 9, run at 0.62 ms
-1 the most effective control settings were: I =0.05, P =0.6.  
For mission 10 run at 0.33 ms-1, the control stability was more easily achieved over a wider range of 
control gains. The most effective control parameters were : I = 0.05, P=0.9. Pitch standard deviation 
was 0.1 degrees, depth standard deviation of 52 mm.  Further analysis and modelling should make it 
possible to correctly set the AUV control in depth, pitch and yaw over the full range of operating 
speeds.  
The control in pitch and yaw are identical and of the form: 
PlaneMoveDemand =  I * pitch_error    +   P * Pitch_error_rate.  
The integration effect of the planes (as they are given a move angle demand , rather than the more 
usual ‘move to angle’ demand),  changes the effect of the two terms by adding an integration. In the 
controller code , - the plane integration effect converts the controller Proportional term (first term) to 
Integral , and the Differential term (2
nd term) to Proportional.  
The pitch controller loop runs within a depth control loop, the gain of which was deliberately set low 
for these initial tuning trials so that the depth control outer loop would be unlikely to affect the control 
stability.  The outer depth control loop has the form PitchDemand = Pz * depth_error.  For all the 
tests, Pz was set to 0.03 radian / metre, a relatively low value, which can also be interpreted as a look 
ahead value of 33 m.  
Attitude and heading were measured with the PNI TCM 5LT sensor at a 1 Hz update rate. There were 
no obvious problems with this sensor, even though it was used with only with the factory calibration. 
The 3 axis measured field and 3 axis accelerometer output for this device was also measured, enabling 
us with further post processing to evaluate the compass errors.  
Launch and Recovery 
ALR sizes and weights:- 
Dry eight – approx 560kg 
Wet weight approx 1200 kg - 14 - 
 
Length approx 3.5m 
Diameter – 0.8m 
Wing span – 2.08m 
Discussions took place before the cruise when it was agreed to use the Rexroth driven ‘Rotzler’ winch 
on the ships’ CTD gantry frame.  However, inspection of the winch during mobilisation showed there 
was not sufficient gap to winch through the Boss Hook connecting the ALR recovery line and the 
winch line.  The plan was changed to utilise a 1.6Ton LeBus GP deck  and a diverter block fixed to 
the deck. 
 
Figure 4.  Deck arrangement, Diverter block (by feet of Steve McPhail on right ) and 1.6T orange 
winch in the background 
 
Recovery lines stored in the ALR:- 
12m x 12mm diameter Dyneema line (85kN breaking load) is attached to 3m  to Nylon 
springer line attached to the ALR lifting eye. 
6m loop x 5mm diameter polyamide grappling line 
18m x 5mm diameter polyamide handling line attached to Dyneema line and nose of ALR. 
Launch was similar to Autosub6000 and Autosub3 except it only has one lifting point.   
The ALR was lifted over the side by means of the winch and CTD gantry, the lift line passed 
over the gantry roll enabling the ALR to be positioned as far away from the ship as possible. 
A light handling line attached to the tail with a small ty-wrap was used to orientate the vehicle 
nose away from the ship. 
The ALR was lowered into the water; the lift line was released via a small Sea Catch.  Soon 
after, the handling line was snatched off and a short 90 second mission started to drive the 
ALR toward open water. 
 - 15 - 
 
 
Figure 5  Autosub L R lowered into the water for its first deployment in the Atlantic Ocean. Note the 
sea catcher release system, and the line on the tail, used to control the AUVs heading during launch 
(this is snapped off with a sharp tug).  
Recovery is similar to Autosub6000 and Autosub3 
The recovery lines stowed in the ALR were grappled using the Resqu Max line launcher to pull out 
the lines.  Frequently, the hand thrown grapples proved more successful than the air launched one.  
Once the ALR’s lines were been pulled on to the deck, the main lift line was made fast to a cleat and 
the end attached to the winch line via a Boss snap hook.  The handling line was untied from the lift 
line to steady the ALR and keep the more vulnerable tail section away from the ships side. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6.  Schematic of the recovery once the ALR 
recovery lines have been attached to the winch line.   
Note the winch line passed over the FAR side of the roll 
to keep the ALR at some distance from the ship, not the 
near side as drawn. 
 
 
 
 
 
The winch operator then hauled the lift line in.  The ALR was lifted up close to the roller and the 
roller brought inboard, lifted over the bulwark and lowered on to its cradle 
The recovery worked well and there were no real problems that needed addressing during the cruise 
although the operation of the ‘roll’ on the CTD gantry proved to be too fast and jerky for smooth 
control.   The same roll is designed to be extendable which would have helped reduce the fee board 
from roll to sea surface.  This would have help reduce the pendulum swing during recovery. - 16 - 
 
Ship hit Incident of 26/1/2011 
On 26/1/2011, the AUV came into contact with the ship following launch.  
The problem with deployment of Autosub LR in the mid ship’s position is the risk that the AUV 
could be sucked under the ship’s starboard quarter, hence we arranged that the AUV runs under its 
own power away from the ship for 30 seconds following release from the ship. The implementation of 
this was that on command, the AUV runs at full power for 30 seconds, with fixed centralised rudder.  
 
 
Figure 7. Autosub LR disappearing under Discovery’s starboard quarter. The command to stop the 
ships propeller was issued  
The AUV was launched as usual from the starboard side, but difficulties with release of the sea catch 
(it taking several attempts over several seconds) , meant that the AUV was not orientated ideally (at 
right angles to the ship , or slightly forward pointing), when it entered the water. In addition the tail 
handling line was released before the sea catch, hence we lost control of the AUV orientation at that 
point.  
On release from the sea catch the AUV was already at a non ideal heading (about 110 degree relative 
to ship bow) . However the PSO decided that it was better to try and drive the AUV away, and gave 
the command for the AUV motor to start.  With the AUV still containing a lot of air, the propeller was 
half clear of the water, and it seems likely that it was the paddle wheel effect of the counter clockwise 
rotating propeller which further yawed the AUV to point further towards the rear of the ship. For the 
remainder of the 30 seconds, the AUV continued to veer around aft-wards, and eventually towards the 
ship.  In retrospect, it might have helped to stop the AUV propeller , after about 15 seconds , when the 
unfavourable trajectory of the AUV was noticed.  
With the AUV drifting towards the starboard quarter, the ships side attempted to swing the ships head 
to starboard with starboard rudder and moderate propeller RPM.  Unfortunately , with the AUV now 
close to the ship, this only had the effect of sucking the AUV under the counter and towards the 
propeller. At this point the request was made by the PSO to stop the ship’s main propeller. This 
(fortunately) was executed almost immediately, preventing much more serious damage to the AUV.  
The AUV surfaced on the starboard side. Initially the severity of the damage was not noticed. 
Following recovery, however, it was noticed that the propeller motor end cap assembly had been hit 
partially off, and the only thing preventing the propeller assembly being lost was the magnetic coupler - 17 - 
 
attraction.  Flooding of the motor assembly destroyed that system, and consequential to that, voltage 
from the main power bus were able to short circuit onto the I2C bus, causing irreparable damage also 
to the sternplane and rudder controllers.   
We had enough spares to effect repairs, and the vehicle was operational 2 days later.  
The general recommendations resulting  from the incident were that:  
Ensure the vehicle is pointing toward not aft of 90 relative to the ships bow.  
Implement in future a more effective quick release system 
Don’t release the tail handling line until after the lifting line is released.  
Being prepared to stop the ALR mission if it looks like the vehicle is turning toward the ship. 
Being prepared to stop all ship manoeuvring if it looks like a collision might happen. 
Implement that the AUV controls its heading away from the ship (rather than just keep constant 
rudder angle). (This was implemented successfully for later missions).  
The Video evidence was extremely useful in determining the chain of events. We should endeavour to 
film L & R as much as possible in the future.  
 
Further launches were without mishap. 
Major Problems and Faults identified 
The list below is a list of the major problems found. Not that several of these problems had already 
been identified, and that some are not fully relevant given planned developments. 
Fault   Description 
 
Remedy 
SYSTEM PROBLEMS 
I2C Lock  The I2C interface on the PXA270 becomes 
locked during I2C transactions , at a frequency 
(minutes to hours, which is clearly unacceptable. 
It seems that noise on the line , or ground noise 
(the actuators and the motor share a common 
power and I2C signal return), make the problem 
more likely to occur. It may also be the case that 
the PIC I2C interfaces can also become stuck.  
This appears to be either a fundamental 
specification problem with the I2C interface 
specification or a problem with its 
implementation. It is clearly not acceptable 
behaviour for the system under any 
circumstances. The problem was recognised 
before the trials. 
There is no remedy at present. 
Although it appears to be 
recognised that there is a hardware 
problem with the PXA270, it is not 
possible to reset the PXA270 
interface using our present drivers. 
The control PICS can be reset, 
curing any such hang up with them, 
and the capability to do this was 
added during the cruise.   
Factors which reduce the likelihood 
of this occurrence, such as the 
ground noise, line capacitance etc, 
could be tackled but there will still 
remain the unacceptable 
vulnerability  –  until we can reset 
the PXA270 I2C interface.   
Dynamic 
linked 
libraries out 
of sync  
A failure during a mission was due to a change 
having been made in one dll (mission support 
scripts ) , and other dll’s which accessed data 
from that dll , not also being recompiled. 
Change Management, Version 
Control, files under one project, 
needed for all builds of the system. - 18 - 
 
More than 
one  instance 
of control 
program 
running 
One abort was caused by the operator running 
two instances of the ALR control programme 
The system and procedures at 
present is recognised to be 
temporary , and  needing better 
control. Such will be implemented. 
A more integrated operations and 
runtime environment is needed. 
VNC crash. 
Cannot be 
recovered 
without a 
system 
reboot. 
The virtual desktop which we were using for 
control of the AUV operation (VNC) will crash 
periodically. This requires a reboot to restart. 
VNC instability is also suspected to  worsen the 
I2C lockout problem (some interrupt conflict or 
service rate problem?) 
Virtual desktop is a temporary 
approach to control of the AUV 
programmes. In future this will be 
replaced with a simpler command 
line driven  system, which can be 
operated over Iridium. Hence not 
worth spending much time fixing 
the VNC problem.  
Checksum 
weak for I2C 
transactions 
The checksum (16 bit addition of all the data 
words) is too weak at detecting message errors. 
This is not of great consequence for command 
data, as the data are repeated every 1 second, 
and sensibility checks are made. However , for 
the configuration data the consequence of a 
undetected fault could be catastrophic and is 
suspected of causing an abort. 
Short term remedy  was to 
implement a “lock variable”. 
Configuration cannot be set if the 
lock is active. The chance of the 
specific unlock code occurring by 
chance was considered acceptably 
low for the trials. Longer term 
solution is probably a stronger CRC 
code on all data. 
The Abort 
system is 
vulnerable 
The abort system as presently implemented is 
recognised to be vulnerable to main process 
crash. The system worked without fault during 
the trials, but the vulnerability is recognised. 
The abort system as presently 
implemented was a short term 
solution. The original design calls 
for a separate system running on a 
PIC. This allows it to operate 
independently of the main system, 
and able to check for the main 
system health via watchdog 
messages. 
System 
Vulnerability 
to  single 
point flood 
A flood in the propulsion motor caused 
irreparable damage to the three motor 
controllers, and an I2C daughter control board in 
the main pressure sphere. Within a single 
mission a flood is irrecoverable, hence what 
happens to the rest of the system is somewhat 
irrelevant. But for the purposes of testing and 
trials however , it is inconvenient to lose so 
much hardware with one hit. 
 
Increased buffering and protection 
will be considered for the system 
rework. Such protection had been 
kept minimal in order to save 
power.  
MECHANICAL PROBLEMS 
Shear Pin 
Failure on 
drives.  
Shear pins for final drive of actuators failing on 
rough recoveries. 
This is as designed. Whether they 
are set to fail at a level practical for 
long term deployment is another 
matter, and will be reviewed. - 19 - 
 
Gearwheel 
failure on 
rough 
recoveries or 
following 
impact 
The final actuator drive gearwheel fails for 
rough recoveries. Note that the shear pin failing 
did not protect this.  
We need to review the design fail 
points in the system with regard to 
the maximum stresses expected 
during operations (e.g. on the 
surface in a force 11), and during 
launch and recoveries.  There are 
conflicting requirements of 
minimising the spread (and cost)  of 
damage caused in a rough recovery, 
versus the cost of rescue (or in 
worst case loss of vehicle)   
following a potentially unnecessary 
failure during a long mission.  
Salt crystals 
binding 
Actuator 
bearings 
Salt crystals binding the actuator bearings post 
missions . 
This would dissolve out when 
deployed, but an inconvenience 
during the trials. A way is needed 
to either prevent this happening , or 
make easy access for flushing with 
fresh water. 
Actuators 
seem to lack 
torque 
At times the actuators did not seem to have 
enough torque enough for the task. However 
much of the problem  can be explained as due to 
a) salt crystal problem during test on deck, b) an 
initially incorrectly calculated maximum PWM 
setting for the actuator. 
We need to review the settings and 
gear ratios, but later tests seemed to 
indicate that the problem may have 
been solved by increasing the 
PWM, and flushing the bearings 
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Autosub Missions Summary Table 
#  Date  Duration   
1  22/1/2011 
1022 
30 s  Test run on surface. ADCP read problem causing crash of main 
control programme. Once this problem had been solved the mission 
was run again. Ground  fault was detected automatically and the 
mission aborted with ballast weight drop. 
2  23/01/2011 
1130 
10 min  Dived successfully but unstable flight due to high control gain 
setting. 
3  23/01/2011 
1500 
2  min  Aborted due to I2C stuck fault on dive run up, causing abort script 
to run. 
4  24/01/2011 
1150 
5 minutes to 
fault, 40 minutes 
submerged 
Sternplane PIC code malfunction  caused actuator to stick, causing 
uncontrolled dive.  The event 'I2C stuck' was detected by the 
system, turning  the AUV motor off. The abort timeout occurred 
before the AUV reached the surface, causing the ballast weight to 
be dropped. The fault was thought likely due to the PIC receiving 
incorrect configuration data due to a weakness in the strength of 
error detection for messages sent over the I2C network. This uses  a 
simple checksum. Work around on the cruise was to introduce a 
lock system for the configuration data. Once a particular variable is 
set, then configuration data cannot be changed.  Longer term 
solution is likely a stronger code, e.g. CRC. 
5  26/01/2011 
0915 
00:51:26  Dive with multiple control coefficient settings for controller tuning. 
On first attempt at this mission, the AUV control crashed, causing 
an abort. Reason was that the operator had loaded 2 instances of the 
control program. 2nd attempt at mission was without incident, but 
due to an incorrect scaling factor in the mission control main code 
the varying speed runs were not effective,  all runs being at full 
power. 
6  26/01/2011  
15:03:00 
NA  During launch the AUV collided with the ship, badly damaging the 
propulsion motor , sternplane and rudder controllers (motor drivers 
all beyond repair). 
6  30/01/2011    NA  Mission aborted as a change had been made to a structure within 
mission support dll, this causing incorrect pointer referencing from 
the abort script. 
7  30/1/2011  NA  Tried running at high power. The  I2C to become stuck during dive 
run up.  In the process of trying to clear the I2C by rebooting the 
system the abort weight was dropped. 
8  30/01/2011  
13:32:00 
00:08:20  Attempted to dive @ 0.8 motor power (~68RPM) failed to dive as 
abort weight already dropped (we did not know that at the time). 
9  31/01/2011  
15:39:00 
00:36:35  Straight run @ ~20m depth and 0.8 PWM  to test control 
configurations.  First part of dive was a success (@ 0.8 PWM) but  
the Control planes locked in position after 1085s for rudder and 
1910s for stern planes.  Caused the sub to surface aborting the 
mission. Cause was I2C lockup. 
10  31/01/2011  
00:00:00 
01:00:00  Straight run @ ~20m depth to test control configurations at low 
speed (0.6 PWM).  Was successful. AUV was recovered at night, 
without problems. 
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6. HyBIS operations: Cruise D360 
 
Bramley J Murton 
Objectives of this mission were to test deep-tow floatation and its effects on the handling of the 
HyBIS  vehicle, test new video recording via iMac computers and Canopus ADVC110 video 
digitisers, and to train personnel in operating and maintaining the system. 
The use of five 10L syntactic foam floatation buoys attached to the deep-tow cable worked well with 
easy attachment and detachment to the cable during vehicle deployment and little discernable effect 
on the vehicle handling. 
The Canopus / iMac / 2Tb USB2 disc storage video recording set-up worked well, via iMovie, 
although the real-time video display via iMovie was a little jerky due to buffering of the i/o data 
stream. This did not affect the recorded vide, but was annoying to watch for the vehicle operators. 
The trainees spent almost the entire dive time piloting the vehicle and managing the data. They also 
spent time servicing the deep-tow termination bottle and the electronics pod. 
Pre-Dive preparations: 
Following low-voltage deck tests of the HyBIS vehicle and top-side controls box, video recorders and 
displays, the vehicle was made ready for launch. This required a fibre-optic termination to be 
completed on the ship-side deep-tow cable. Unfortunately, the ship-side termination kit was found to 
be incomplete with no activator for the setting compound or cleaving tool for the fibre. Regardless, 
the termination of the fibre was made good using super glue and araldite. 
 
 
Dr Bramley Murton (yellow boiler suit)  at the HyBIS nerve centre 
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Date: Sunday 22
nd January 2011; Latitude 23°560N; Longitude 20°42’W; Depth 1100m 
At 23:00h GMT the vehicle was tested through the deep-tow cable and low-voltage deck power pack 
and found to be working. On switching to the high-voltage supply through the deep-tow cable, a 
ground (earth) fault was detected by the HyBIS power transformer. This was traced to the termination 
bottle where a stray strand of copper conducting wire appeared to have broken through the insulation. 
The bottle was opened, the fault corrected, new insulation put in place, tested, the bottle reassembled 
and filled with oil. By this time it was 4:30 am and the dive postponed as the dive window was 
closing at 7am. However, the fibre-optic link in the bottle was found to have failed. We opened the 
bottle, cut the ST connector and reterminated the fibre including polishing it. Unfortunately, the ship’s 
fibre-optic termination kit was incomplete with no cleaving tool or fibre glue. The fibre was 
eventually fixed and polished, tested and the bottle secured. 
The next day, when testing the vehicle on deck through its high-voltage power supply, another earth 
fault was detected by the top-side transformer’s GFI. The bottle was checked for insulation using a 
mega meter and found to have reduced insulation at 1000V. The bottle was opened, and the wiring 
remade with crimps, over insulated with heat shrink and re-tested. The insulation was still reduced at 
1000V, so the entire high-voltage termination assembly inside the bottle was wrapped inside a 0.5mm 
thick polycarbonate cylinder. This proved sufficient to ensure good high-voltage insulation. 
However, the fibre optic termination was found to be poor with the fibre loose inside the ST 
connector. This is almost certainly a result of the inappropriate glue being used (the correct fibre glue 
was missing from the termination kit). The fibre was cut, stripped and a new ST connector glued on. 
The fibre then was re-polished and tested resulting in a 3db loss over the length of the deck cable. The 
termination bottle was reassembled, tested and attached to the HyBIS vehicle where it was tested 
again at high-voltage and through the fibre-optic core. 
Date: Sunday 22
nd January 2011; Dive 30; 23°560N; 20°42’W, 1100m 
2300H. Vehicle pre-checked and ready. Deployed with five floats on deep-tow cable. First float 
attached at 10m w/o. Then subsequently at 3 m intervals. Stopped at 50m and powered up vehicle. All 
systems ok. Proceeded to veer winch at up to 40m/min to the seafloor at 1004m. Flat and muddy 
seabed. Ship drifting to SW at a maximum of 0.3kts. Vehicle behaved well, with manoeuvrability of  
±50m. USBL not working dues to wrong transponder ID code. Spot light on forward looking light bar 
caused over saturation in centre of field of view. Moving slowly into progressively deeper water. 
0513H, 23
rd January 2011, depth 1410m, edge of steep cliffs. Lava tubes, sheet flows and fissures on 
near vertical walls. Cliff is steps of 200m vertical ascent followed by wide ledges of up to 100m. 
0552H: End of dive, started recovering vehicle. 
DIVE 31: Date: Sunday 22
nd January 2011; 23°54.11N; 20°43.13’W, 1100m 
Pre-dive preparation involved rotating downward looking camera to ensure the front of the vehicle 
faced towards the top of the video screen. The HD camera inside its pressure bottle had to be adjusted 
for position to avoid vignetting in stills mode. Swapped the forward spot light for a flood light to 
homogenise the field of illumination.  
16:25H, deployed HyBIS with five cable floats. At 50m, the vehicle was powered up and the USBL 
with the correct ID code was now tracking. Descended to 1138m on to a rocky but smooth seafloor. 
Ship drifting at 0.5kts to the SW, causing reduced manoeuvrability of the vehicle. Sheet flows and 
sediment. Some coral and sponges. Attempted to grab some loose boulders. Very difficult to control 
vehicle with a remote winch operator. Also speed of movement caused the vehicle to be pulled away 
from the grab sites before we could close the grab. When on the bottom, the winch veered out a 
further 2 to 3 metres of cable – the cable floats seemed to be able to keep this loose cable free of the 
vehicle which remained stable. - 23 - 
 
17:40H, at 1161m, the vehicle lights thrusters, hydraulics, control telemetry and compass card failed 
and stopped communicating. The vide feeds remained on, as sis control to the HD camera. Powered 
off the vehicle and initiated recovery. 
Diagnosed a 24V power supply failure inside the electronics pod. Removed the pod from the vehicle 
and opened it on the work-bench. Found ~10ml of water inside the pressure tube. Checked continuity 
of the 24V supply wires and 24V PSU. Removed the PSU and powered it directly on the bench with 
110V ac in (from the HyBIS deck box) and confirmed zero volts output. Checked with HydroLek Ltd. 
whether the lower powered PSU (50W instead of 100W) will suffice. Changed the PSU for the lower 
powered version, and powered up with 110V. The PSU produced the required 24V and the internal 
electronic boards  became live (diagnostic LED’s lit up). Tested communications on a fibre-optic deck 
cable and all systems found to be working. 
Checked the pod for evidence of low-pressure leaks. Some water was found  behind the DGO’Brian 
bulkhead. Some long head-hairs were also found crossing the end-cap O-ring seal. Found several 
scratches crossing the o-ring face seal on one end of the pressure tube. The scratches are deep enough 
to cause concern. Close inspection of the pressure tube revealed a pre-anodising scratch on the 
opposite face seal outside of the O-Ring face. Also tool marks on the end-cap where the piston seal 
screw caps are seated and inside the piston seal hole into which the pistons seals are set. 
After taking advice from Kevin Saw (Design engineer on board) we decided the pressure tube and 
end-cap need re-facing and re-anodising. Documented and disconnected the bulkhead leads from the 
terminal rails on the electronics chassis and removed it to safety. Wrapped and sealed the electronics 
chassis in bubble wrap and cling film.  Vehicle ready to be decommissioned. 
On inspection of the grab bucket, it was noticed that there is a slight bend of the leading edge of the 
over-bite jaw. This will need straightening at the NOC workshop. 
Other issues: The HD camera needs to be removed fro its pressure pod and set to ‘show data on video’ 
by operating the touch screen on the camera body. This setting is stored, but only for 3 months. Other 
settings such flash, focus, face recognition, demo mode, etc. have to be reset each time the camera is 
used. 
Conclusions: 
At the start of the trials, the HyBIS vehicle was found to be working perfectly on deck. 
The termination of the deep-tow cable proved problematic without the correct components in 
the ship-supplied termination kit.  
The termination bottle also developed an earth leak at high-voltage, the ultimate cause of 
which remains unknown, but was overcome with the use of additional insulation. 
The deep-tow floatation buoys worked well. 
A low-pressure leak, possibly caused by a scratch on the pressure tube o-ring face, caused us 
to terminate the vehicle trials. The cause of the scratch is unknown, but was found upon 
opening the pressure tube for the first time on this trial. 
Other manufacturing defects were found on an end cap, although these have not leaked in the 
past and, they are not desirable and are probably stable. 
The 24V PSU failed, possibly a result of water damage. 
 
Recommendations: 
The pressure tube and end-cap must be re-ground and re-anodised. 
Better insulation is required for the high-voltage termination bottle connections. 
Spare boards are required for the electronics and power pods. These include spare PSUs. 
Ideally, professional video recording decks should be purchased. 
The three laser ranging devices need to be refurbished with a more secure oil-filled box for 
the batteries. 
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7.  Ellsworth HD camera trials  
Lee Fowler 
The objective s of the trials were to test the HD video camera and lighting system for the Lake 
Ellsworth project.   
20/01/11 Dive 1  
20:06   off deck – Target depth of 4013 meters 
20:08  Wet – out at 30m/min 
20:42  Lost video and control communications with vehicle at 1158 meters – dive aborted with 
vehicle recovery necessary. 
21:36  Trials rig on deck. 
Fault found with the fibre optic link within the HyBIS termination bottle and a re-termination was 
necessary, OTDR indicated a total loss of fibre connection. Fibre and electrical connections was re-
made with point to point reading from the main lab junction box to the HyBIS termination pot of 
3.5db 1310nm and 2.8db at 1550nm. 
21/01/11 Dive 2. 
03:05   off deck – Target depth of 4027 meters 
03:08   Wet – out at 40m/min 
05:10  Veer speed reduced to 5m/min at 3950 meters 
0518  On bottom at 4036 meters – Light L1 – DM252-MR11 20watt @ 10 deg 
05:25  Light L2 – DM252-MR11 20watt @ 30 deg 
05:30  Light L3 – DM252-MR11 35watt @ 20 deg 
05:33  Light L4 – DM252-MR11 35watt @ 30 deg 
05:46  Recover at 40m/min 
07:10  Winch fault at 97 meters – all stop 
07:40  Winch fault cleared, continue recovery 
07:45  On deck 
Video from the IK-HD1H was found to be excellent with good definition at all illuminated heights of 
bottom. 
Problems found with the Ellsworth camera trials rig on dive 2. 
1  -  Narrow lighting angles were chosen for the first dive because the altimeter chosen for the 
Ellsworth probe was unavailable for this cruise and therefore only visual bottom detection was 
available for off bottom height. It was found that these lighting angles only illuminated about half of 
the cameras field of view and that wider angles would be necessary on future dives. The power 
outputs of the lighting were found to be sufficient to produce good lighting density for the standard 40 
dB version of the IK-HD1H camera. The Ellsworth probe cameras will be 54 dB military versions and 
a controllable light source would be needed for this higher gain unit.  
2 - The Convergent design nanoFLASH HD recording unit was borrowed from Polecam Ltd for this 
cruise to trial this type of recording device for possible use on the Ellsworth probe. It was found to be 
a version manufactured before October 2009 without the power down mods found on later versions. 
This old version lost setting when powered down so the unit reverted back to its default settings which 
included a recording file format of raw HD *.Mov. Currently this unit is fitted with 2 x 32GB ST 
cards and this proved insufficient capacity to record video once the vehicle reached the bottom on - 25 - 
 
dive 2 – 133 minutes total record time for both cards. Modification to this unit have now been done to 
retain a *.mp2 file format and also offer surface control of these recording options. Test has shown a 
recording time of over 4 hours with the new modifications to the nanoFlash. 
 
25/01/11 Dive 3 
02:40  off deck – Target depth of 1085 meters – Veer at 40 m/min 
03:20  Depth 100 meters – reduce veer to 5 m/min 
03:40  On bottom – Light L2 - DM252-MR11 35 watt @ 20 deg 
03:50  Light L3 – Solarforce high pressure Xenon 
04:00  Light L4 - DM252-MR11 35watt @ 20 deg 
04:11  Light L1 -MR16WT15 50watt @ 60 deg 
04:26  Recover – problems with winch during recovery 
06:20  On deck 
A successful deployment of the Ellsworth HD camera test rig with full control of lighting and video 
recording modes produced excellent quality HD video. All lights producing good illumination with 
Light L1 producing the most effective lighting results with over illumination only occurring at 0.5 
meter or less. Dimming capability would therefore be needed with this current lighting scheme. 
Results show that a single 40 – 50 watt @ 50 – 60 degree lighting angle would be optimum for the 
Ellsworth probe. 
26/01/11 Dive 4 (45deg camera angle) 
21:58  off deck – Target 3860 meters – Veer at 60m/min 
23:14  Reduce veer to  10 m/min at 3800 meters 
23:16  Reduce veer to 5 m/min at 3850 meters 
23:33  On bottom at 3909 meters – Light L2 - DM252-MR11 35watt @ 30 deg 
23:40  Light L3 – Solarforce high pressure Xenon 
23:45  Light L4 - DM252-MR11 35watt @ 20 deg 
23:50  Light L1 -MR16WT15 50watt @ 60 deg 
24:00  Recover 
02:30  On deck 
As with dive 3, lighting and the video were near perfect with L1 giving the best definition.  
27/01/11 Dive 5 (Bait bag attached) 
21:42  Off deck – Target 4048 meters 
12:20  Winch stopped with scrolling problems at 3947 meters 
01:20  Winch fixed – veer at 5 meters/min 
01:33  On bottom at 4049 meters – light L4 
01:38  Light L3 
01:42  Light L2 
01:44  Light L1 - 26 - 
 
01:49  Recover at 40m/min 
04:50  On deck 
Final trials dive with the camera rig fitted with a bait bag to see if any biology could be filmed. The 
IK-HD1H camera once again performed faultlessly throughout but no biology came into view.   
8. Pelagra Operations 
 
Kevin Saw and Sam Ward 
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20.01.11 Deployment 1 
1810h  Idronaut Ocean Seven 304 CTD logger (s/n 0605070) deployed on deep-tow wire at position 
24.250°N, 20.505°W to 1000m. 
1919h  CTD deployment all finished. 
 
2230h  Pelagra P6 (isopycnal mode) deployed at position 24.268°N, 20.512°W. Target depth 300m. 
Scheduled to surface at 1705h on 22.01.11. Three opening cups and one blank. 
No tag lines were used during deployment resulting in significant swinging. Trap reluctant to sink 
once released leading to suspicion that one or more weights had been dislodged as trap swung on 
entry to water. 
2300h  Pelagra P7 (isobaric mode) deployed at position 24.271°N, 20.508°W. Target depth 300m. 
Scheduled to surface at 1735h on 22.01.11. Three opening cups and one blank. 
Tag lines used resulting in controlled deployment. Trap sank promptly as expected. 
2310h  Pelagra P6 still visible at surface. 
2330h  Pelagra P8 (P4) (isopycnal mode) deployed at position 24.273°N, 20.503°W. Target depth 
300m. Scheduled to surface at 1805h on 22.01.11. Three opening cups and one blank. 
Tag lines used resulting in controlled deployment. Trap sank promptly as expected. 
21.01.11 
0024h  Pelagra P6 still visible on surface so recovered to deck at position 24.175°N, 20.505°W. 
Trap was floating very low with waterline approximately level with base of flash light. Trap was 
grappled and transferred to a lifting strop. Once clear of water it was apparent that all weights were in 
place. Base of trap suffered major strike on ship's rail when swung inboard - no apparent damage but 
Apex float was found to have slipped down in its clamps once on deck; this is easily rectified. No 
obvious reason has been found for failure to sink - investigations are ongoing. 
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1601h  First surface position received from P7 at 24.285°N, 20.394°W. P7 was not scheduled to 
surface until 1735h so this was an indication that something was not right. 
1853h  First surface position received from P8 (P4) at 24.284°N, 20.354°W. 
Surface positions for P7 and P8 (P4) were 7 and 10 nm respectively on a bearing of approximately 
84° from the deployment position. It was expected that the traps would follow the Canary Current in a 
south-westerly direction but this was not the case. 
1900h  P7 recovered at 24.263°N, 20.382°W. The sample cups were found to have opened but not 
closed. Depressor weight and end-of-mission abort weights were both absent and the over-depth abort 
weight was in place as expected. No significant sediment was collected probably due to wash-out on 
ascent. 
  On inspection, P7's APEX float was found to have terminated its profile and initiated ascent 5 
hours early. This erroneous behaviour has been seen before and will be investigated. Sample cup 
operation was subsequently checked on deck and found to be trouble free; it is not clear why they did 
not close during the mission. 
 
1945h  P8 (P4) recovered at 24.277°N, 20.350°W. Sample cups had operated as expected. Depressor 
weight and end-of-mission abort weights were both absent and the over-depth abort weight was in 
place as expected. An amount of sediment and a few comb jellies were collected in the three sample 
cups. No sediment was visible in the blank. - 29 - 
 
 
 
24.01.11 Deployment 2 
0000h  Pelagra P7 (isopycnal mode) deployed at position 23.918°N, 20.470°W. Target depth 300m. 
Scheduled to surface at 1835h on 26.01.11. Three opening cups and one blank. 
0030h  Pelagra P8 (P4) (isobaric mode) deployed at position 23.915°N, 20.470°W. Target depth 
300m. Scheduled to surface at 1905h on 26.01.11. Three opening cups and one blank. Park Band, 
Mbd, set to +/-5 dbar. 
Textbook deployments, both traps sank promptly as expected. Deployed for 24 hours longer than 
previously to check if depth stability improves over time. 
26.01.11 
1701h  First surface position received from P7 at 23.821°N, 20.308°W. P7 was not scheduled to 
surface until 1835h thus indicating that it had terminated its mission early again. 
1952h  First surface position received from P8 (P4) at 23.821°N, 20.310°W. 
  Surface positions for P7 and P8 (P4) were 13 nm on a bearing of approximately 123° from the 
deployment position. 
2003h  P7 recovered at 23.795°N, 20.308°W. The sample cups were found to have opened but not 
closed. Depressor weight and end-of-mission abort weights were both absent and the over-depth abort 
weight was in place as expected. No significant sediment was collected probably due to wash-out on 
ascent. 
Base of trap suffered major strike on ship's rail during swing but appears to be undamaged. On 
inspection, P7's APEX float was found to have terminated its profile and initiated ascent 5 hours early 
as in Deployment 1. On inspection it was thought that the driving worm was a little tight to the worm-
wheel so the gearbox position was adjusted. - 30 - 
 
 
 
2048h  P8 (P4) recovered at 23.813°N, 20.315°W. Sample cups had operated as expected. Depressor 
weight and end-of-mission abort weights were both absent and the over-depth abort weight was in 
place as expected. An amount of sediment was collected in the three sample cups. No sediment was 
visible in the blank. 
  P8 (P4) was recovered along starboard side tight to the ship's side rather than being swung 
round to the after deck. This gives a much more controlled recovery. 
   - 31 - 
 
 
 
27.01.11 Deployment 3 
2000h  Pelagra P7 (isobaric mode) deployed at position 24.177°N, 20.533°W. Target depth 300m. 
Scheduled to surface at 1935h on 29.01.11. Three opening cups and one blank. APEX float was set up 
with a Park Band, Mbd, of +/-100 dbar (max of available range) with the intention of investigating the 
traps behaviour in 'passive' mode, i.e. no buoyancy adjustments. It was realised that P7's Deep Profile 
Descent Time parameter, Mtj, was set to 300 minutes (5 hours) whereas P8's was set to 0. Given that 
P7 had consistently terminated its mission 5 hours early and P8 had not, it seemed likely that the Mtj 
parameter was to blame; this was set to 0 to test this theory. 
  Deployed using longer release strop than usual. The strop consequently snagged on Iridium 
antenna on release. Strop was eventually dislodged using long pole - no apparent damage was caused 
and trap sank promptly as expected.  
2030h  Pelagra P8 (P4) (isobaric mode) deployed at position 24.177°N, 20.533°W. Target depth 
300m. Scheduled to surface at 2005h on 29.01.11. Three opening cups and one blank. Piston Adjust 
Period, Mbx, set to 10 minutes and Park Band, Mbd, set to +/-10 dbar. 
Textbook deployment using the usual short release strop, trap sank promptly as expected. 
2145h  Pelagra P6 flashing light beacon deployed at position 24.215°N, 20.627°W on Ellsworth 
video camera for pressure switch test. Light switched off at 23m on descent and back on at 16m on 
ascent. 
29.01.11 
2028h  First surface position received from P7 at 24.115°N, 20.416°W. It does not appear that P7 has 
surfaced early as before. 
2033h  First surface position received from P8 (P4) at 24.125°N, 20.428°W. 
  Surface positions for P7 and P8 (P4) were 9.5 and 8.4 nm respectively on a bearing of 
approximately 120° from the deployment position. - 32 - 
 
2248h  P7 recovered at 24.090°N, 20.403°W. Sample cups had operated as expected. Depressor 
weight and end-of-mission abort weights were both absent and the over-depth abort weight was in 
place as expected. Very little sediment was collected in the three sample cups. No sediment was 
visible in the blank. 
 
 
2048h  P8 (P4) recovered at 24.097°N, 20.417°W. Sample cups had operated as expected. Depressor 
weight and end-of-mission abort weights were both absent and the over-depth abort weight was in 
place as expected. Very little sediment was collected in the three sample cups. No sediment was 
visible in the blank. 
  Both traps were recovered along starboard side tight to the ship's side rather than being swung 
round to the after deck making for well controlled recoveries. 
   - 33 - 
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Summary of Pelagra Operations 
The primary object of D360 for the Pelagra project was to test the APEX float control firmware 
following the latest in a series of rectifications and improvements carried out by  the supplier, 
Teledyne Webb Research. Specifically: 
To address the inability to respond to exceeding limits of a +/-0.01 sigma-theta horizon 
Two isopycnal missions were run using P7 and P8. Both APEX floats responded to sigma-
theta limits correctly. 
 
To extend the mission data-logging capacity to cover the whole mission 
Data-logging was complete for all six missions, the longest being three days. 
 
To provide the ability to choose between isopycnal and isobaric missions 
Both isopycnal and isobaric missions were run and functioned as expected. 
 
To provide date/time within the filename for all log files to avoid over-writing on subsequent 
missions 
Date/time has been added to all log files. 
 
To add piston position as logged data in the mission .msg files 
Piston position is now logged in the mission .msg files. 
 
To address the issue of some floats prematurely terminating their missions 
Teledyne reported that they could find no reason for some floats to terminate their missions 
prematurely. During this cruise it was realised that mission parameter Mtj, Deep Profile 
Descent Time was set to a positive number on P7 (0300) which had previously been affected. 
Setting Mtj to 0000 has cured the problem. 
Some minor mechanical improvements had also been implemented. Specifically: 
Replacement of lower 'legs' with larger diameter ones to improve sturdiness 
Replacement of all wire thread inserts with bar nuts 
Addition of ball bearings to sample cup cam ring support rollers 
All of the above appear to have functioned as expected. 
 
 
Pelagra recovery at dusk - 35 - 
 
9. MYRTLE-X system tests 
 
Steve Mack and Geoffrey Shannon 
 
 
Geoffrey Shannon and Steve Mack (Right), with the rig for testing the MYRTLE-X systems.  
 
21/1/2011. MYRTLE- X wire  test 1. 
 
1200 All running in lab on frame....Logger scanning telemetry ok acoustics ok 1310 Wire test frame 
in water descending to 3000m Telemetry working fine, communications with modem good and 
communications with acoustic releases good. 
1330 Didn’t hear expected transmission from acoustic modem...direct telemetry working fine 
1335 tried more commands to assess problem..no response from second unit but direct telemetry still 
good. 
1340 decided to bring it back up to assess problem. Looked like problem with communication 
between the two units hence the modem telemetry ok but the data transfer and other functions not 
working. 
1355 @~100m tried commands again and communications between the two units now working. 
1400 Back on deck, all working ok. 
Suspect communications cable that links the two units to be giving problems intermediately or under 
pressure. 
Removed cable and re-made all joints. Leaving overnight to set and will be good to go from 22nd to 
asses if this has solved the problem. 
 
22/1/2011 MYRTLE X  Wire test 2  - 36 - 
 
1315 All powered up and initialised in Lab 
1330 All set up on deck ready to go 
1357 In Water 
1420 All ok down to 500m Communications problem from wire test 1 better. 
  Pod release commands getting across the 2 units but logger data not. 
1440 At 1000m release commands responding ok 
1551 Down at 3000m.  
  Fired Pod4 release command, all received and responded ok 
  Fired Benthos acoustic release at 11.5kHz code D, responded as expected. 
1600 Logger data scan came through although none have been seen when expected previously. 
1615 Still at 3000m.  No logger scan received. All release commands still operational. 
1708 Back at 1000m Release commands ok. No logger transmission at 1715. 
1745 Back on surface. 
The pod release fired had partially burnt through the burnwire. Suspect this to be due to the distance 
from the burnwire loop and its ground and the alignment of the two. 
The 10" Benthos acoustic (11.5kHz D) had not fired. Can only surmise that the wire exposed on the 
burnwire loop was not sufficient to make a god connection with the ground. 
The acoustic was fully operational on deck and was showing a burn voltage at the burnwire when 
activated! 
Plan: 
To shorten cable data cable that links the two units. 
To re-align pod release burnwire and expose more wire to burn To re-align burn wire within release 
module and expose more wire to burn. 
Re- do wire test down to 3000m and assess results. 
23/1/11  Wire Test 3:  
Test with 3 Benthos acoustic releases and MYRTLE-X Telemetry and release burnwires. 
2000 Delay in test due to winch AC failure. This was resolved and winches now ok to use. 
2030 Wire test frame in water heading down to 3000m Pod release command ok and all other 
telemetry ok but data telemetry not being received. 
2047 At 3000m 
2148-2150 Fired all 4 pod release burnwires...all acknowledged. 
2154-2156 Fired all 3 Benthos acoustic releases...all acknowledged. 
2157 heading back up to surface. 
Intermittently picked up scan telemetry on way up. All other telemetry working fine. 
2230 Frame back on deck. 
All 3 Benthos acoustic fired, even the one that hadn't fired on wire test 2 Only one pod release 
burnwire had fired despite all acknowledging burn and being the same set-up. 
After some assembly on the frame. The system was powered up and initialised. 
It was noticed after a period of time that the data from the Infra Red transmitters was being corrupted. - 37 - 
 
Numerous tests and re-programming were undertaken to find the cause and alleviate it, but to no 
avail. 
These data transfers are what control the timing of the Iridium data transfer after the pod has released  
therefore without the correct data, the pods would begin transmitting on the sea-bed. 
Given the nature of these problems and the uncertainty of the various burnwire releases it was decided 
not to deploy the lander. 
More tests would be carried out to try to shed some light on the release issues. 
27/1/11  Wire tests 4:  
In order to try to assess the problems with the acoustic releases and burnwires it was decided to do a 
couple of wire tests, just with the Benthos acoustic releases. 
Test 1: 
2 off Acoustic releases 
10.5kHz, 14.0kHz. Both had braided burnwire as standard with minimal wire exposed. 
These were housed in the fittings as would be on a frame for deployment. 
Both of these acoustics have worked over the previous wire tests. 
1235 In water. Heading down to 3000m 
1401 At 3000m 
1402 Fired both releases. Both Acknowledged as burning 
1404 Heading back up to surface. 
1449 Both acoustic timed out as expected 
1510 On Deck. Both Acoustics had fired ok. 
Test 2: 
2 off Acoustics. 
14.0kHz was replaced with the 11.5kHz which was fitted with a standard braided burnwire with 
minimal wire exposed. 
The 10.5kHz acoustic had only the burnwire replaced with a standard 'inconel' burnwire. 
The 11.5kHz had a burnwire that had not fired on wire test 2 but was ok on wire test 3 The 10.5kHz 
acoustic had fired on all previous tests. 
1530 In water 
1718 At 3000m 
1719 Fired 11.5kHz and 10.5kHz. Both acknowledged as burning ok. 
Stayed at 3000m for full duration of burn (~50mins) 
1804 Both acoustics time out as expected.. Heading back to surface 
1920 On Deck 
11.5kHz acoustic had burnt ok. It had done this on the last occasion but not on the previous one. 
10.5kHz had not fired the burnwire which was fully intact. This acoustic had fired its burnwires 
successfully throughout all tests so far. 
10.5kHz acoustic was fired on deck and a burn voltage was present at the burnwire. +28V The 
burnwire module was then put in a bowl of sea water and burnt as expected. - 38 - 
 
Initial conclusions are that there is some pressure related problem but it is intermittent? 
The only thing changed from the time it did burn on the previous test ( a couple of hours before) was 
the burnwire itself. 
Need further investigations back at the lab, preferably pressure tests to try to shed some light on this 
problem. 
There, as yet, are no obvious signs of where the problem lies. 
 
 
Foreground:  MYRTLE-X.  Background:  Pelagra (having just been landed on the aft deck of RRS 
Discovery) 
 
29/1/2011   Wire test 5. ‘FETCH’ 
The 'FETCH' Is a new Sonardyne product based on their existing range of acoustic modems and 
releases. 
The new instrument is contained within a 17" glass sphere and is intended as a lander, mounted on a  
ballast weight to be release and recovered at the end of it deployment. The Instrument measures 
bottom pressure and temperature via a Digiquartz pressure sensor. 
The unit has had limited trials so it is very useful to trial this instrument prior to further procurement 
and deployment. 
The Instrument features acoustic telemetry and a mechanical 'screw' release and is planned to be  
incorporated into MYRTLE-X in the future to provide an additional telemetry and release option. 
Sonardyne Wire test: 
Unit set up in lab and logging as of 1830 Z Test plate fitted to mechanical release to simulate ballast 
weight. - 39 - 
 
2330 Frame into water 
  Communications all ok and status updates received ok. 
0003 At 1000m 
  All communications ok and status updates all ok. 
0015 All data was received from the sea-bed acoustically. All transferred ok. 
0018 Release was armed and fired. 
  Release response acknowledged by unit. 
0020 Test of communications ok 
0023 Heading back up to surface. 
0028 At 500m all communications and status updates ok 
0043 On Surface 
  Release had operated ok and test plate had detached from the instrument. 
0048 Until logging halted and brought back into lab. 
Successful trial, both in the lab and in the water. A few problems seen in previous trials have been  
overcome and this was a very good test of the system. 
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